The article begins with a general account of the early development of periodical payments and then summarises the legislative reforms which introduced the new statutory regime in 2005. Next the indexation issue is described, and its potential for causing a substantial shortfall in damages is explained. The litigation on that topic is chronicled, and the factors which enabled the court to select a suitable measure for uprating payments are set out. Finally, the effect of the changes is illustrated by looking at the latest statistics relating to damages paid out by the NHS.
THE INITIAL ATTRACTIONS OF PERIODICAL PAYMENTS
The lump sum system of paying damages survived almost intact until just over twenty years ago. Compensation almost always took the form of one large payment made on a once and for all basis. It is true that interim awards and provisional damages had made inroads upon this general principle, but the potential for seeking multiple payments was severely limited. Instead the traditional system continued to impose upon claimants an enormous responsibility for their future: they had to manage the lump sum in order to ensure that it would continue to meet their needs for the rest of their life. Unfortunately, inflation and the vagaries of the returns upon investment often resulted in the rapid erosion of the compensation. In addition, the damages were bound to be insufficient where losses continued for a longer period of time than that forecast in the settlement or by the court. This frequently happened where the compensation depended upon an assessment of life expectancy for, if the claimant lived longer than expected, the money was bound to run out. 7 Recipients of damages awards thus had not only investment but also mortality risks thrust upon them, and often compensation proved insufficient.
To counter such criticisms of the lump sum award, the concept of a structured settlement was imported from North America and first used for a UK resident in 7 Forecasting how long a seriously injured person will live is notoriously difficult, and actuaries have
accepted that estimating what they term an "impaired life" is much more an art rather than a science. 1989. 8 It enabled seriously injured claimants to receive regular payments which could be guaranteed to last for their lifetime. This was usually achieved by the defendant liability insurer converting part of the traditional lump sum into a series of payments by purchasing an annuity on the claimant's life from a life insurance office. Because of this life element, payments could continue even though a claimant outlived his projected span of years. 9 In addition, the payments were free of tax, 10 and could even be set up to enable some claimants to retain entitlement to means-tested benefits even though they were receiving large regular sums. 11 The payments could also be protected against inflation in prices by being tied to increases in the Retail Prices Index (RPI). 12 Although this provided much more security for the future, it did not offer protection against the higher inflation to be expected in rising wage costs rather than prices. Nevertheless, claimants receiving structured payments were relieved from the stress of having to invest and be responsible for a lump sum far greater than most people encounter in their lifetime. Overall, therefore, they could gain considerable reassurance about their financial future and could plan with greater confidence how to reconstruct their lives.
More detailed accounts of these advantages of structured settlements can be found elsewhere. 13 It was not only claimants that received the benefits. From the state's viewpoint, the new form of payment was attractive because it encouraged the spending of damages on the purposes for which they had been awarded. The compensation was less likely to be dissipated as a result of mismanagement or the depredation of friends or relatives. 14 The injured were then less likely to find themselves reliant in the longer term on the limited resources of the welfare state.
Structured settlements were especially attractive to the NHS because they enabled Health Authorities to retain capital sums and defer the full costs of clinical negligence to the future: there was a substantial cash-flow saving. Insurers, by contrast, had much less to gain and were therefore often unenthusiastic about structures. However, even they could benefit from appearing to offer lifetime support to an injured person. For a variety of reasons, therefore, structures received support from many quarters.
LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND THE REMOVAL OF THE PARTIES' VETO
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In spite of these benefits, further expansion of structured settlements was hindered by a variety of factors, the most important being the refusal by many lawyers to give attributed to the innate conservatism of the legal profession, 16 together with ignorance
or misconception about what the periodical payments actually involved. Although for some years it was emphasised that lawyers had a duty to consider setting up a structured settlement and could be liable in negligence if they failed to do so, 17 in practice periodical payments were obtained in only a minority of the cases in which they could have been sought.
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The result was that, largely through inertia, the lump sum retained its dominance. 
EXPECTANCY RISKS
The tradition in damages is for there to be a clean break, with the defendant giving the claimant a once and for all payment to end matters. In contrast, a structured settlement or a court ordered PPO results in a continuing relationship between the parties with payments that will vary over time. However, the Courts Act made the distinction between the different forms of payment very much greater by conferring upon PPOs particular advantages over the previous ways in which damages were paid.
The Act not only fundamentally changed the way in which damages are assessed, but it also offered claimants considerable incentives to seek PPOs rather than lump sums.
PPOs were also given advantages over structured settlements negotiated out of court.
The key distinguishing feature of a PPO is that, unlike nearly all structures, there is no need to calculate any lump sum in order to work out what periodical payments must be made. Instead, using a "bottom-up" approach, the court assesses the periodical payments the claimant needs for the future irrespective of their capital cost.
These annual payments do not have to be adjusted to take account of speculative estimates of the claimant's life expectancy. Nor do returns have to be forecast of the income that arises upon investment of the damages: the lump sum is not there to invest. Instead, the defendant must comply with the order to make the specified regular payments no matter how the market performs and even if the claimant lives longer than forecast. In contrast to the traditional lump sum system, therefore, it is the defendant rather than the claimant who is exposed to an uncertain financial future by being burdened with the twin risks of investment return and mortality.
This can be explained further by noting that in the calculations needed for a PPO there is no place for the 'Ogden Tables.'  29 That is, multipliers and discount rates are not used: no multiplier is required to reflect the period of years of the loss in order to convert it into an immediate capital amount; and no discount rate is needed to convert Furthermore, the order extends for an uncertain period -the rest of the claimant's life.
The risks of uncertainty traditionally run by claimants have thus been transferred to defendants.
THE INDEXATION ISSUE AND THE POTENTIAL SHORTFALL IN PAYMENTS
In spite of the considerable advantages offered by PPOs as a result of this transfer of the mortality and investment risks there was still concern that new form of payment might not be widely used. For almost three years after the Courts Act came into force it was thought that the lump sum might be more flexible, and better able to deal with the claimant's needs. This argument succeeded in a number of cases with the result that, although PPOs were being considered, ultimately they were often rejected. . To achieve full compensation a discount rate of at most 1% and not 2.5% should be applied. This would substantially increase lump sum payments. For example, for a ten year old with normal life expectancy requiring modest care costs of £10,000 a year, the lump sum needed would increase from £337,000 to £527,000. In effect, the lower lump sum presently awarded will fund payments of only £6,400 a year instead of the £10,000 actually were claimants' lawyers and courts having doubts about the efficacy of judicial "bottom-up" assessments which transferred the above risks? The answer lay in concern about exposing the claimant to another risk: this was that the periodical payments would not offer sufficient protection against anticipated increases in care costs because these were more affected by wage rates rather than prices. Although protection against price increases could be guaranteed, protection against wage increases could not. Whether it could be achieved depended on how payments were to be indexed. This was crucial to the future use of periodical payments.
Periodical payments have the advantage of providing certainty of provision for life.
However, unless they are linked to an appropriate index the certainty they achieve may become the certainty of under-provision. The concern was that, even if periodical payments were tied to increases in the RPI, they would be insufficient to meet the claimant's future needs. This is because home care costs make up only about one tenth of one per cent of the RPI, and they have only a limited relationship with increases in the price of those consumer goods and services which dominate the index. Most future losses of personal injury claimants are directly or indirectly related not to price increases but to earnings. In particular, a very large element of future care costs is dependent upon the earnings of those workers who provide the care: in the leading case the non-earnings element of care was expected to be only three per cent of the total care costs. 31 Historically, on average, for the past seventy years the earnings of the population at large has risen about two per cent more a year than prices. To illustrate the potential for under-compensation let us assume that the claimant obtains a periodical payment award of £10,000 a year to cover future care costs. If the award were linked to the RPI and if that index rose by, say, 2.5 per cent a year then, after 30 years, the amount being paid would be £20,975. However, if the award were indexed to reflect earnings growth at 2 per cent above RPI, the amount to be paid would rise to £37,500 a year. The cumulative deficit over the 30 year period would then be £171,000 and the claimant would be receiving insufficient to meet his current costs. The deficit resulting from the difference between prices and earnings would continue to grow, and the support given to the claimant would continue to diminish.
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The capital value of the difference between the indices is a substantial sum: a two per cent difference over 40 years will cost defendants an extra £200,000 in immediate lump sum terms for each £10,000 a year required. In one recent case the cost of the private nursing home was £132,000 a year and this was projected to last another 48 years. 36 If an earnings index were used in this case it would have increased the lump 33 As illustrated in R. Hogg, "Will Periodical Payments Provide Adequately for the Costs of Care?" In part, the decision was based on the prospect of the lump sum attracting high investment returns. It was particularly unfortunate that shortly thereafter the stock market lost a third of its value. 35 As also illustrated by R. Hogg op cit above note 33 at 213.
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sum required by more than £3 million. The NHS is considerably affected by such indexation because it has a disproportionate number of these complex and expensive care cases.
There are two examples of notable past cases which further illustrate how periodical payments could prove insufficient to meet the increasing costs of care.
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The first case is of some prominence because originally it had come before the Court of Appeal to determine whether certain social security monies could be claimed even though substantial structured settlement payments were being received. from their home they were involved in a road accident caused entirely by the negligence of another. Both drivers were killed. Catherine lost the husband she had recently married, and suffered catastrophic injuries herself. In seeking damages on her behalf, Catherine's father was keen to ensure that she would be looked after in her private nursing home for the rest of her life. Any money that might accrue to her estate upon her death was not an important consideration. Instead the major concern was that, given her very uncertain life expectancy, the damages should be managed in order to ensure that, if she lived longer than the projected period, there would continue to be money to pay for her care. The best means of achieving this proved to be via a structured settlement which, because it could be linked to a life annuity, could be guaranteed to be in payment for the rest of Catherine's life.
Catherine's settlement undoubtedly has proven a favourable one for her. She continues to receive payments even though she has now outlived not only the pessimistic life expectancy relied upon by the defendant insurers, but also the compromised figure that would have been agreed by the parties had only a lump sum been paid. As a result of the structure, her family gained the reassurance that she would continue to be looked after for the rest of her life. Payments for her began at £2,146 a month but were to rise in line with the RPI. As a result, they increased on average by about 3.1 per cent a year and amounted to just over £4,000 a month in Baroness Scotland, said that it was intended that RPI should be the norm, but that it could be departed from "in exceptional circumstances." 43 Although this phrase was also contained in a first draft of the Explanatory Notes to the Courts Act, it was later revised to refer only to "appropriate" circumstances, and again these were not defined.
In the final version of the Notes the guidance is only that it is expected that RPI will be used in the great majority of cases. These reservations proved to be well founded when, both at first instance and on appeal, the claimants once more triumphed. The Court of Appeal considered itself bound by the previous decision in Flora to reject the submission that exceptional circumstances were needed to depart from the RPI. In addition, the Court recognised that PPOs created a quite different payment mechanism from lump sums so that, in effect, two separate regimes were now operating within the tort system. It rejected the suggestion that there would be "an unacceptable divergence" if a wage related index were used for PPOs and a price related index for lump sums. However, it cannot be disputed that a divergence arises. It is created because the traditional lump sum, unlike a PPO, calculates a present value for the claimant's future losses by using a discount rate set at 2.5 per cent. This rate, in theory, is supposed to represent the real return the claimant can obtain by investing the damages received. 48 This real return makes allowance both for the tax the claimant must pay on the income from investing the damages and for the reduction in the value of that income caused by inflation.
However, the rate takes into account only the inflation in prices, not that in wages.
This was confirmed in Cooke v United Bristol Healthcare
49 where the court steadfastly refused to depart from price inflation when assessing the lump sum. Here, then, is clear water between the methods used to allow for inflation when calculating a lump sum as opposed to a PPO, the one being based on prices, the other on earnings.
Finally, the judges in Thompstone also rejected arguments against the use of an earnings index which were based on "distributive justice." Defendants reasonably feared that this index would lead to much higher payments with the result that the NHS, in particular, would be adversely affected. An actuary giving evidence on behalf of the NHS argued that the increase in value for clinical claims already in existence would be £1.678 billion. Although the trial judge rejected this as a significant over-estimate because it was based on a flawed empirical study, she agreed that the increase in cost would be "very significant. from private bodies; some had a longer history or were more consistently produced than others; and some were able to look more precisely at particular sections of the workforce. Because each set of figures was open to some criticism, there was no immediately obvious alternative index that could be used.
An academic labour economist, Dr Victoria Wass of Cardiff University, had a major influence on the Court in determining which path to take. She was described by the trial judge as "an impressive witness." 57 The Court of Appeal accepted the following criteria that she suggested for adopting an alternative measure to RPI which would approximate to the salary-based costs of home care:
"(i) accuracy of match of the particular data series to the loss or expenditure being compensated; (ii) authority of the collector of the data; (iii) statistical reliability; (iv) accessibility; (v) consistency over time;
(vi) reproducibility in the future; (vii) simplicity and consistency in application." The AEI plots average earnings growth by surveying each month the payments made by 8,400 employers to about 9 million employees. It takes into account bonuses, allowances and overtime to arrive at an average earnings figure. However, the Court rejected the use of this index because, although long established, accessible and well known, the information it provides is too general. In particular, it does not relate to particular employments. Instead it is based on the mean level of earnings for all workers and, crucially for present purposes, it does not directly relate to the earnings of the one in 40 employees who work as carers. Their earnings are likely to be lower than average and, as a result, if the AEI were to be used it would probably overstate the claimant's future care needs. Instead of using this index the Court adopted the more precise measure of earnings contained in the more complex ASHE data because it could be related to specific occupations.
Like the AEI, ASHE is based on a representative survey of earnings and appears as a statement of earnings levels instead of a numerical index such as the RPI. At first it may appear less useful than AEI because fewer people are surveyed and the data is collected less frequently: the survey takes place only once a year as opposed to once a month, and it covers only about one per cent of those employees paying tax on a payas-you-earn basis, these numbering about 245,000 workers. However, ASHE data has become increasingly more sophisticated. Its crucial advantage over the AEI is that it can be sub-divided to account for different occupational groups and different levels of earnings within occupational groups. The important group for present purposes is that numbered 6115 comprising "Care Assistants and Home Carers." There were 6,630 employees who fell into this group to constitute the representative sample in 2006. ASHE reflects the specific factors which have affected individual groups so that, for example, it is apparent that the earnings of care assistants in the last decade have risen much faster than average earnings overall.
In addition, the specific data for the occupational group can be further subdivided into ten parts according to their hourly rate of pay. This enables separate tracking of the earnings of the more skilled carers who are likely to be placed at the top of the earnings scale. As a result it is now common to see a PPO tied, for example, to the 70 th percentile of ASHE 6115 (where 30 per cent of carers earn more than that rate and 70 per cent less). Which exact percentile is to be used in a particular case depends upon which is nearest to the weighted average hourly rate of pay of the different carers in the overall package which has been specifically designed for the claimant. This weighted rate of pay thus depends upon the complexity of care provided in each case.
Potentially this can be a difficult and controversial calculation because it will include different rates of pay for day, night and weekend work, as well as different rates for the levels of experience and skill of the carers. Defendants can be expected to examine such calculations closely and readily contest them.
Arguments about the weighted rate of pay for the different carers and the hours that they work illustrate that there is still scope for dispute. However, the Court has tried to limit other disagreements by discouraging certain lines of attack. Having accepted that the appropriate measure for the test cases before them was ASHE 6115, the Court of Appeal was not prepared for that issue to be re-opened in later cases unless substantially different evidence and new arguments were produced. Judges were instructed to have no hesitation in striking out attempts by the parties to do otherwise.
Similarly, the Court was against defendants calling their own expert evidence to show that a PPO does not best meet the claimant's needs. 59 Finally, in order to make the ruling. 60 Again practitioners were warned that courts would make it difficult for them to depart from this Schedule. As a result of these measures one judge hoped that "[t]he armies of experts will then be able to strike their tents and return to the offices or academic groves from which they came." 61 Although this may happen with regard to the principle of indexation, the assistance given by experts on the facts of specific cases will not diminish. Their employment in a wide variety of personal injury contexts has continued at an increasing pace, and is a very distinctive feature of such litigation today compared even to the recent past.
INDEXATION OF FUTURE LOSSES OTHER THAN CARE
If departure from RPI is justified to take account of earnings when assessing care
costs, it appears logical to extend the argument to the calculation of damages for the loss of future earnings themselves. At present the claimant's lump sum damages are frozen at the date of trial or settlement, and no allowance is made for the anticipated rise in the standard of living which all workers are expected to enjoy in the future.
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Of course, allowance is made for the higher wages resulting from prospects of promotion, but not for the increases that might be expected because of the rise in living standards. This seriously limits the size of the lump sum award, 63 and gives the lie to the avowed aim of returning the claimant to the pre-accident position.
However, in periodical payment cases claimants will now be able to enjoy future Thompstone not only influences the extent that PPOs are used in NHS cases but also the amount of damages that are at stake. The NHS Litigation Authority has acknowledged that 2009 was a "challenging year" partly because Thompstone had made a "significant impact" upon the amount that it had to pay in settlements. This is illustrated by the overall increase in the cost of serious injury claims: the size of the average claim over a £1 million rose by more than a third, increasing by £1 million to £3.7 million. 68 This higher cost per claim partly accounted for the 22 per cent rise in the cost of all claims made against the NHS in the last year: the total sum rose from £661 million to £807 million. In part this was due to an unusual and unexplained 11
per cent rise in the number rather than the value of claims. 69 However, the increasing cost per claim was also a major factor, and it was Thompstone that largely accounted for the increase in the cost of long term care cases. Anticipating a further rise in overall costs, the Authority announced that premiums had risen by 53 per cent from £467 million to £713 million. Again this was partly due to the Court of Appeal decision. Overall it is clear that Thompstone has already had a major impact upon the cost of NHS litigation.
THE LIMITS OF PERIODICAL PAYMENTS
Although the precise scope for using PPOs subject to the new indexing provisions has not been finally determined, all parties now accept that they will become an increasingly important feature of settlement negotiations and personal injury awards.
67 Ibid. However, lump sums will continue to be the form in which the vast majority of claims will be compensated. Why is this so and what limits the potential use of PPOs?
The most important factor is that PPOs can only be imposed if there is future loss; past losses or non-pecuniary loss can only form a part of the Order if the parties agree.
Future loss is unusual, only occurring in about 1 in 14 personal injury cases. 70 This is because the vast majority of claims are for minor injury where there are no continuing ill-effects and where the average payment is for but a few thousand pounds. In such cases a lump sum is obviously the most efficient and fairest way of disposing of the claim.
Even where the losses are severe and the damages are substantial a PPO can be avoided by the parties if they settle out of court. By striking a deal a claimant can arrange for the payment to be in the form of a lump sum alone. It is then possible to avoid judicial involvement in the amount of capital to be received and the timing of payments. However, those representing claimants who want to take this course should ensure that they have explained fully the advantages of PPOs. Their clients must give informed consent to the alternative form of settlement being proposed. Even in such cases PPOs will very much affect the bargaining process: as explained elsewhere, the threat of burdening a defendant with continuing payments can be used to gain higher lump sum awards.
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When a future loss case comes to court there will still be instances of where a judge will consider it inappropriate to order periodical payments. For example, the flexibility offered by the lump sum will be an important factor where the claimant's care needs are extremely difficult to forecast and could vary considerably. 
CONCLUSION
The new periodical payments regime introduced by the Courts Act 2005 is a major development in tort law. A real attempt has been made by the legislature to meet the future needs of claimants and thus move closer towards restorative justice. However, the key to the extent to which periodical payments will be used is the method by which they are to be indexed, and this was left for the courts to decide. It is not surprising that the case which determined this issue was selected by personal injury practitioners as the most important of its year. The Thompstone decision, although neglected by academics, is a landmark case in the law of tort. It goes a long way towards reassuring a few very seriously injured tort claimants that their future will be more secure.
